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Abstract  
This article explores the challenges of ethnic-based participation and its potential for creating inclusive 
and effective forms of decision-making for marginalized social groups. Empirically, it examines a 
recent attempt to establish more participative forms of resource and development governance for 
indigenous communities in Bolivia through Free Prior and Informed Consent/Consultation (FPIC). 
Rooted in international human rights law, FPIC aims at achieving more effective bottom-up 
participation by establishing an obligation to consult - or obtain the consent of - indigenous peoples 
before large development projects and legal reforms that would affect them can proceed. Interest in 
FPIC initiatives has been growing for reasons that range from efforts to build more equitable 
management of natural resources to attempts to introduce more effective local-scale practices of 
participation and active citizenship. We argue that the idea of prior consultation and FPIC itself are not 
neutral instruments; they will not automatically lead to better or more democratic governance and a 
more equal society. The way in which FPIC is currently being implemented and framed in Bolivia is in 
tension with broader ideas of representation and legitimacy, inclusiveness and management of public 
and common goods because there is no real clarity as to who is entitled to participation, why they do 
and whether they are doing so as a corrective to exclusion, a promotion of citizenship or as a 
mechanism for redistribution. As we show here, FPIC implementation can have unintended 
consequences and consultation can sometimes embed existing social, cultural and economic tensions. 
The paper eventually offers some broader reflections on participatory governance and collective rights 
especially in relation to the tensions between inclusive participation and exclusive rights or – put 
differently - the challenges for building cultures of participation and inclusion in complex and ethnic 
diverse democracies. 
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Democracy in Latin America is both stable and stale. Democratization has certainly 
institutionalized party competition, but the introduction of electoral politics since the 
1990s has proved of limited value in terms of encouraging activist participation and 
even in its capacity to ‘represent’ the interests and opinions of the majority of citizens 
across the region (Fung and Wright, 2001). One consequence is a growing awareness 
within international organizations that new ways are needed to encourage bottom-up 
forms of political engagement, if democracy is to take deeper root in the region 
(Eberly, 2000; Maxwell et al., 2012; Faguet, 2014). As a result, attention is shifting to 
initiatives that seek to deepen community democratic participation and practices of 
citizenship (Eversole et al., 2005; Gaventa, 2006; Selee and Peruzzotti, 2009; Sen, 
1999). The importance of strengthening community participation is recognized in 
particular in ethnically divided polities such as those that can be found in Andean 
America.   
The rising interest in new forms of direct participation in Latin America is 
distinctive in that the participatory imperative has become embedded within a 
dominant neoliberal political economy. Multiculturalism and ethnic-based politics, 
around which enhanced or novel forms of participation have been shaped, in the 
Andean region in particular, did not prove easy partners for neoliberal politics. 
Indigenous claims for collective (rather than individual) rights and for territorial 
autonomy raised what Deborah Yashar (1999: 96) rightly called a “postliberal 
challenge” to regional models of democracy. As Yashar (1999) argues, indigenous 
rights claims question the idea that democracy corresponds to the pursuit of 
individualized citizenship and demand the recognition of non-traditional rights and 
institutions that reflect the existence of ethnically defined forms of citizenship within 
nation-states. Recognizing collective, indigenous rights also constitutes a challenge 
for the participation agenda – who is to speak, for whom and with what legitimacy? 
The embrace of indigenous rights thus carries with it the potential to amplify the 
voice of a traditionally marginalized group in and, therefore, to play a role in 
strengthening democracy, and to raise questions as to whether it enhances the rights, 
and resources of all citizens, whatever their ethnicity.  
The tensions around collective rights, participatory governance and 
democratization are the subject of this article. In particular, we explore the challenges 
of ethnic-based participation and its potential for creating inclusive and effective 
forms of decision-making for marginalized social groups. Empirically, we examine a 
recent attempt to establish more participative forms of governance for indigenous 
communities in Bolivia, where ethnicity has historically been one of the principal 
political and social cleavages, through the Free Prior and Informed 
Consent/Consultation (FPIC) 2 . Rooted in international human rights law, this 																																																								
2 In academic and international literature, both concepts and acronyms of “free prior and informed 
consent” (FPIC) (UN-REDD, 2013; Ward, 2011; Sunderlin et al., 2014) and, more rarely, “free, prior 
and informed consultation” (FPICon) (Caruso et al., 2003; MacKay, 2005; Griffiths, 2005; Goodland 
2004; ILO, 2013) are used, not always in a consistent way, to identify more or less demanding 
participation mechanisms for indigenous peoples. In this paper we use the acronym FPIC to refer to 
both mechanisms of consultation and consent, following Goodland’s (2004) idea that ‘meaningful 
participation’ and accept his view that consultation would lead to consent, if applied in good faith. 
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framework aims at achieving more effective bottom-up participation by establishing 
an obligation to consult - or obtain the consent of - indigenous peoples before large 
development projects and legal reforms that would affect them get underway 
(Goodland, 2004). Ultimately, we argue that the FPIC alone does not, and may not be 
able to, resolve issues of democratic inclusion and participation. Instead it opens up 
different kinds of political conflicts, between social groups and between society and 
the state, which do not necessarily lead to fairer outcomes in terms of social justice.  
The paper proceeds as follows. After a discussion of the significance of 
participation for democracy and the ethnic-based participatory turn in Latin America, 
we outline the FPIC framework in the context of the agenda of indigenous rights. We 
then identify some of the most contentious issues that characterize the process of 
‘translation’ of FPIC from international to domestic law that, as we see it, will 
inevitably affect how FPIC actually works. They include: a) who is the subject of the 
rights being claimed, b) how those rights can be operationalized, c) the procedures 
that should be put in place to ensure collective consultation and d) the practice of 
collective compensation for policies that breach those rights. A discussion of FPIC 
itself as a mechanism of participatory governance and its operation in Bolivia follows. 
FPIC is, we argue, different from other experiments in participation such as 
neighborhood councils, stakeholders’ and workers’ committees, participatory 
budgeting programs and village-based governance that have flourished in recent years 
(Fung and Wright, 2001) in that is: rooted in international norms, suggesting 
potentially more leverage for implementation but also the risk of thin contextual 
fitness; only relevant as a mechanism for participation for ethnically defined 
communities, thereby embedding a powerful exclusionary, as well as inclusionary, 
ontology; relevant principally for development projects and natural resource 
management, as if issues and practices of power can be meaningfully separated by 
sector; and often operated via strategic bargaining rather than inclusive deliberation, 
with limited potential, therefore, to shape local institutions and embed participation 
within them. In the conclusion, we offer some broader reflections on participatory 
governance and collective rights especially in relation to the tensions between 
inclusive participation and exclusive rights or – put differently - the challenges for 
building cultures of participation and inclusion in complex and fragile democracies.  
The article is based on original data. Around 30 interviews were carried out in 
Bolivia with a variety of actors: leaders of the main social organizations involved in 
this debate (mainly indigenous/native organizations and peasant unions 3 ), 
representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international 																																																																																																																																																														
Moreover, this is consistent with the fact that in Spanish only one concept is commonly used– Consulta 
Libre Previa e Informada – which, while literally translates FPICon, in practice is often used also to 
indicate consent (consentimiento) and, more broadly, new consultative mechanisms for indigenous 
peoples. Our arguments and conclusions are generally applicable to ethnic-based consultation 
mechanisms in general (whether or not consent is a requirement). See section 3 for detailed discussion 
of FPIC and FPICon.   
3 Confederación Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB), Confederación de Pueblos 
Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB) and the Cosejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu 
(CONAMAQ).  
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development agencies particularly active on indigenous peoples rights agenda (e.g. 
Danish Cooperation DANIDA, IBIS, Fundación Tierra, Ciudadanía, Centro de 
Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social CEJIS, the network Ciudadanos por el 
TIPNIS), international organizations’ officers (International Labour Organization 
ILO, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
UNOHCHR, United Nations Development Programme UNDP), and civil servants and 
ministers, in particular from the Ministry of Government and the Ministry of 
Autonomies which were directly involved with FPIC discussions. Participant 
observation in official and informal meetings about FPIC was also conducted as well 
as in-depth analysis of preliminary proposals and law drafts. Fieldwork in Bolivia was 
carried out between July and August 2013 during the final round of consultations on 
the FPIC Law. A short field trip was also conducted at the ILO headquarter in Geneva 
to gather views on FPIC from the United Nations body in charge of its regulation and 
promotion.  
 
The Participatory Turn and its Critics 
 
There is no single model for encouraging participatory governance in the global 
South. Participatory approaches include decentralization of institutions, consultations 
and the introduction of spaces for democratic deliberation and discursive 
participation. Decentralization processes aim at triggering an institutional transition 
from hierarchical, bureaucratic mechanisms of top-down management to a “system of 
nested self-governments characterized by participation and cooperation” (Faguet, 
2014: 2). Arguments in favor of decentralization include making governments more 
accountable, reducing corruption and the abuse of power, increasing political 
competition, and improving political stability by providing minority groups with 
greater access over subnational institutions and resources (Faguet, 2014). The 
introduction of new forms of deliberation, in contrast, is about limiting the risks of  
“political domination by rendering states accountable to (some of) the citizenry’’ 
(Fraser, 1990: 59). Drawing on ideas of deliberative democracy, spaces of debate and 
consultation are created in order to provide a collective holding to account of leaders 
and encourage discussion as a way of reaching decisions (Abelson et al., 2003; 
Chambers, 2003). Both democratic deliberation and decentralization share a concern 
with strengthening democratization processes whether through top-down institutional 
reforms or bottom-up voice practices. For this reason they can be thought of as 
complementary, not as alternatives, to more traditional forms of representative 
democracy.  
If calls for more participatory governance were originally intended to address 
the democratic deficit, they were quickly taken up by the development planning 
community, not just in Latin America but across the global South (Bryld, 2001; 
Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Parfitt, 2004). Development initiatives that try to involve 
local communities in decision-making processes are frequently funded and supported 
by international agencies and they are standardly seen as a more efficient way to get 
things done than working through state institutions (Mato, 2000). The environmental 
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sector has proved particularly receptive to the introduction of participatory planning 
partly because of the added value that local and community actors are thought to 
bring in terms of local and socially-embedded forms of knowledge in relation to 
resource management and the commitment to equitable, rather than market-driven, 
solutions to environmental management (Agrawal, 2003; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 
Gibson et al., 2000).  
  But, despite endorsements from international organizations and planners, 
questions have been raised about the value of the participatory turn. Cooke and 
Kothari (2001) expressed some skepticism early on as to whether organized 
participation genuinely contributes to the quality of democracy or shape more 
inclusive decision-making in development planning. They took the view that 
participation was often used as a mechanism to legitimize, not challenge, the actions 
of large development agencies such as the World Bank, and had very little 
emancipatory and inclusive impact at the grassroots. Part of the problem, they 
suggested, was that participation was increasingly deployed in the service of a 
fundamentally conservative neoliberal development agenda. Without policies to 
reduce economic equalities, the introduction of tokenistic forms of participation or 
‘invited’ participation was meaningless (Cooke and Kothari 2001, Miraftab, 2003). It 
was also suggested that encouraging formalistic participation would undermine or 
neutralize the original counter-hegemonic potential within concepts of participation 
(Leal, 2007). Empirical evidence for this critique emerged from studies of public 
deliberation mechanisms that suggested that they are often unrepresentative, subject 
to conscious manipulation and unconscious bias, and disconnected from actual 
decision-making (Delli Carpini et al., 2004).  
Other critiques have followed. It has become clear, for example, that the 
standardized methods of participation that are deployed by governments and 
international organizations generally fail to appreciate the importance of place and 
context (Bryld, 2001). Standardized approaches also tend to take an optimistic – and 
unrealistic – view on civil society, which they see as homogenous, unified, inclusive 
and intrinsically ‘civil’, despite evidence to the contrary (Ehrenberg, 1999; Lane, 
2003). And, whilst it is often assumed that decentralization will mediate political 
tensions by institutionalizing them at the local level and neutralizing the possibilities 
of anti-systemic mobilization (Diamond et al., 1995; Hechter, 2000), there is, in fact, 
a risk that the new local institutions might cement and even magnify existing social 
and ethnic cleavages (Masaki, 2010; Myerson, 2014). This risk is greater in 
circumstances where participatory governance institutionalizes identity-based systems 
of resource allocation in contexts characterized by endemic poverty and 
marginalization.  
 
 
From Neoliberal Democracies to Plurinational States: Ethnicity and 
Participation in Latin America 
 
The participatory turn has been hugely significant for how democratization has 
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unfolded in those countries of Latin America where ethnic cleavages are significant.  
Although the politics of the ballot-box was well established across Latin America by 
the middle of the 1990s, (Seligson, 2007) and democratic institutions reasonably 
solid, popular dissatisfaction with the exclusionary nature of new democracies was 
also evident. With the new millennium, a wave of social mobilizations and claim-
making led by a wide range of ethnic groups and international movements (including 
human rights organizations, scholars, churches, and environmentalists) sympathetic 
with the indigenous cause introduced important challenges to the democratization 
process (Le Bot, 2009; Engle, 2010). At the same time, international NGOs and 
donors, which have traditionally wielded influence over development and 
democratization processes in Latin America, and whose authority was strengthened as 
democratic governments sought to align their own policies with international agendas 
on human rights, encouraged political leaders to consider the domestic value of 
cultural and ethnic diversity (Barsh, 1994; Panizza, 1995). As a result, neoliberal 
governments across the region acknowledged political claims for ethnic recognition 
and institutionalized collective and cultural rights through constitutional reforms as a 
way of establishing a new social order based on multiculturalism, even though they 
oversaw the introduction of a political economy that penalized the poor (Hale, 2005; 
Sieder, 2002). 
In Bolivia, besides institutionalizing new territorial regimes for indigenous 
peoples (Tierras Comunitarias de Origen, TCOs) (Assies et al., 2001), the neoliberal 
constitutional reform strengthened the decentralization process, indirectly 
encouraging the political organization of traditionally marginalized sectors and the 
formation of ethnic-based political parties  (Van Cott, 2007: 128). And Bolivia was 
far from unique in this respect. Between late-1990s and early-2000s, political leaders 
who proclaimed their own ethnicity with pride or who represented organized 
indigenous movements gained access to national parliaments and control of local and 
subnational governments in Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana and Venezuela as well as in 
Bolivia. The new politics of ethnicity seemed to offer the opportunity to deepen a 
process of democratization that had been dominated by traditional elites and, at the 
same time, promised to shift resources towards the poorest and most marginal social 
groups. For this reason, the rise of indigenous parties was greeted as an important 
achievement not only in terms of political inclusion for indigenous peoples but also 
for the quality of democracy and participation in the region (Van Cott, 2009; Postero, 
2006; Webber, 2011).  
In most cases, notably the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia and 
the Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP) in Ecuador, ethnic-based 
parties did not pursue an ethnocentric and exclusionary program. Instead they tended 
to articulate ethnic claims along with classic populist electoral strategies that appealed 
to diverse sectors of the electorate. This apparent contradiction can be explained, at 
least in part, by the ambiguity and fluidity of ethnic identities in the region, which 
incentivized the need for new parties to develop inclusive agendas and styles (Madrid, 
2012), at least during electoral campaigns. At the same time, however, the resurgence 
of identity politics also created centrifugal tendencies, and led to the emergence of 
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“ethno-territorial projects” in which essentialized discourses of identity were put to 
work in order to legitimate claims to territorial and political rights. In Bolivia, two 
emblematic examples here are the ayllu4 movement that represents the interests of 
Aymara peoples of the highlands, and the lowland autonomy movement, which calls 
for the creation of a ‘camba nation’ controlled by Santa Cruz white elites (Perreault 
and Green, 2013; Gutiérrez Chong, 2010). These tensions between nationalist and 
localist projects were also embedded in the new Constitution, which was approved 
following a referendum in 2009. The Constitution refers to plurinationalism in Bolivia 
as a “transterritorial articulatory process”, thus emphasizing its potential to revitalize 
the nation-state, and, at the same time, incorporates models of subnational autonomy 
(autonomías) which reflect the “intensification of localizing cultural sentiment and 
citizen rights claims tied to regionally-specific political-economic, labor, and natural 
resource formations” (Gustafson, 2009: 989). The Constitution also introduced a new 
broader ethnic subject: the ‘nación o pueblo indígena originario campesino’ (the 
indigenous native peasant nation or people) defined as “each and every human 
collectivity that shares cultural identity, language, historical tradition, territorial 
institutions and view of the world, and whose existence is previous to the Spanish 
colonial invasion” (Art.30). This new subject can now claim a specific type of 
territorial autonomy, the Autonomía Indígena Originario Campesina (AIOCs), as well 
as other specific rights associated with customary justice and cultural integrity 
(Tockman and Cameron, 2014; Tomaselli, 2015).   
Overall, then, new practices of ethnic-based participatory governance have 
been introduced in Bolivia, and indeed in other countries of the region, since the 
1990s. It is in this context that consultation mechanisms, such as those envisaged by 
FRIC, acquire their importance as a key instrument though which democratic 
agreement can be reached especially in relation to potentially contentious 
development projects in the areas of resource governance and planning (McNeish, 
2010). But while ethnic-based participation has the potential to strengthen processes 
of inclusion and indigenous participation, in the resource sector especially, the right to 
identity and voice are embedded in complex political, social and economic contexts 
that shape how they are interpreted and implemented. New ethnic-based rights are not 
simply a neutral good for democracy; as Sawyer and Gomez (2008: 5) write: “seeking 
and acquiring indigenous rights is not in and of itself emancipatory. Rather, it 
recalibrates the area of struggle”.  These struggles shape the concrete meaning FPIC 
initiatives and other forms of consultation acquire.  
 
FPIC and the New Frontier of Indigenous Participation  
 
Across the world, indigenous peoples inhabit and claim land rights in areas that are 
environmental protected and often extraordinarily rich in terms of biodiversity and 
both renewable and non-renewable resources. In Latin America, it is estimated that 																																																								
4 In the highland culture, a kinship-based social unit which possesses a specific, continuous or 
discontinuous, territory. 
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indigenous communities manage approximately 25 per cent of the Amazon basin, one 
of the most biodiverse regions in the world (Van Dam, 2011). A further 24 per cent of 
the region’s protected areas overlap with indigenous territories (Sabogal et al., 2008). 
There are large reserves of oil and gas, many of them yet untapped, across these 
biologically and culturally diverse territories. In recent years, record oil prices, 
growing global demand, new technologies and commodity-based national economic 
strategies have led to unprecedented levels of natural resource exploration and 
extraction in these areas (O’Rourke and Connolly, 2003; Hinojosa et al., 2015). The 
result is both a new kind of politics that encourages the deployment of indigenous 
symbols and culture (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012) alongside massive environmental 
and social disruption due to deforestation, drilling platforms, pipelines and pollution. 
Not surprisingly, these development projects have become increasingly contentious, 
given the scope and magnitude of planned activities (Finer et al., 2008; Sawyer and 
Gomez, 2008).  
Latin American states have resisted ceding valuable ownership over subsoil 
natural resources. But they have put in place a range of reforms to devolve certain 
land and natural resource management rights to indigenous peoples. These efforts are 
supported in international human rights law, in particular by ILO Convention 169 
(C.169, 1989), the only binding treaty on indigenous rights, and by the United 
National Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP, 2007). Together 
with a growing body of jurisprudence, these instruments seek to codify, promote and 
protect indigenous rights globally. They set out a multicultural model of the state in 
which indigenous peoples’ cultural distinctiveness and integrity is formally 
recognized and protected, including their rights to land and resources as well as 
governance through indigenous customary law and institutions. In addition to 
protecting indigenous peoples from discrimination, international norms grant them 
collective rights to maintain and develop their unique cultural identity (Anaya, 2004). 
According to the UNDRIP, indigenous peoples should also be able to freely negotiate 
their own political status and representation and to pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development within the states in which they live (Anaya, 2009).  
The FPIC framework is a response to the growing claims for cultural integrity 
and self-determination and the fact that the rights of indigenous peoples are rising up 
the international agenda. It is designed to provide a mechanism to regulate and 
operationalize the participation of indigenous peoples in environmental decision-
making and political processes on questions where their interests are directly affected  
(Ward, 2011). While there is no single internationally agreed definition of FPIC nor a 
one-size fits all mechanism for its implementation (Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer, 
2013; UN-REDD, 2013), references to the need to consult or to obtain consent from 
indigenous peoples is mentioned in all main human rights instruments on indigenous 
rights. Art. 6 of C.169 states that:  
 
Governments shall consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures 
and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration 
is being given to legislative or administrative measures, which may affect them 
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directly. (…) The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall 
be undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with 
the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures. 
 
A recent ILO Handbook on C.169 tries to clarify some of the conflictual issues raised 
by the Convention and clearly places emphasis on the right of indigenous peoples to 
be consulted, although it does not suggest that consent is necessary and it does not 
invest indigenous peoples with veto power:  “Convention No. 169 does not provide 
indigenous peoples with a veto right, as obtaining the agreement or consent is the 
purpose of engaging in the consultation process, and is not an independent 
requirement” (ILO, 2013: 16). UNDRIP, meanwhile, explicitly calls for the “free 
prior and informed consent” (FPIC) of indigenous peoples, and sets out the 
circumstances when this is required, namely: relocation of the population (Art. 10), 
impact on culture and intellectual property (Art. 12), adoption and implementation of 
legislative or administrative measures (Art. 19), exploitation of lands, territories and 
natural resources (Art. 27), disposal of hazardous waste (Art. 29), and development 
planning (Art. 30). In addition, the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-Safety (2000) to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity seeks to attach FPIC to the transboundary 
movement, transit, handling and use of all living organisms (EMRIP, 2011). In short, 
FPIC is now talked of in connection with a very broad set of issues, although thus far 
it has been applied mainly in relation to natural resource exploitation. The UNDRIP 
also specifically refers to the three main attributes that characterized consent: ‘free’, 
‘prior’ and ‘informed’. According to the Report of the International Workshop on 
Methodologies Regarding Free Prior and Informed Consent (E/C.19/2005/3), 
endorsed by the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2005, 
‘free’ means that there must be no “coercion, intimidation or manipulation” (2005: 
46) and that the process is self-directed by indigenous communities themselves; 
‘prior’ implies that “consent is sought sufficiently in advance of any authorization or 
commencement of activities” (2005: 46); ‘informed’ refers to the nature of the 
engagement and type of information that should be provided and delivered according 
to specific criteria, including clarity, consistency, transparency, cultural sensitiveness 
and linguistic appropriateness. Because it is so recent, FRIC is international law-in-
the-making and, as such, it contains some confusion about the value and purpose of 
consultation, the nature of consent and the arenas where it is required, something that 
the ILO itself has recognized:  
 
We got stuck diagnosing the problem and we overlooked how to resolve it. C.169 
is a broad norm that leaves issues that are highly sensitive and where indigenous 
communities are waiting for clear answers to the post-ratification stage and (…) 
national legislation (…). This is particularly true in the case of prior consultation. 
The ILO thus did something it rarely does: it published a handbook on how to 
understand a Convention. (…) This is because one of the ILO’s major challenges 
at the moment is to provide tools to states, to stop analyzing the problem and to 
start offering solutions (interview with ILO officer, Geneva, March 2015).5  																																																								
5 All interviews’ translations from Spanish are by the authors.  
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Still, in spite of its legal ambiguities, FRIC is increasingly being put to use. 
The United Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (UN-REDD) recognized FPIC as a key instrument for 
sustainability (UN-REDD, 2013; Sunderlin et al., 2014). FPIC experiments have been 
introduced in a number of countries including Suriname, Guyana, Tanzania, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia. But it is in Latin America above all – 
and especially Bolivia and Peru – where attempts to use FPIC to institutionalize 
collective rights are most advanced. Both Bolivia and Peru moved quickly to 
constitutionalize FPIC mechanisms (Consulta Previa Libre e Informada) and both 
have pushed on with the challenge of operationalizing it. In Peru, a FPIC Law (Nº 
29785) was approved in 2011, while in Bolivia a Draft Law has been widely debated 
and is awaiting parliamentary consideration. The success, or otherwise, of these 
initiatives are, therefore, of huge significance for whether FRIC will work as an 
instrument to embed better participatory governance and allow a greater say in the 
management of territory and the environment for indigenous peoples everywhere.  
 
Towards a FPIC Law: The Bolivian Case 
 
FPIC arrived in Bolivia at a moment of rising demand for, and recognition of, 
indigenous rights. Bolivia ratified ILO 169 Convention on the Rights of Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in 1991 (Law 1257) and formally incorporated UNDRIP as a 
national law in 2007 (Law 3760). The obligation to consult the country’s indigenous 
peoples was established via the Hydrocarbon Law (3058) of 2005, which states that: 
“native, indigenous and peasant communities and peoples (…) should be consulted 
in a prior, mandatory and timely manner when it is intended to develop any 
hydrocarbon activity (...)” (Art. 114). Consultations shall be conducted in good faith 
by the competent governmental authorities in accordance with the circumstances and 
characteristics of each indigenous people (Art. 115). Between 2007 - with the 
passing of the Supreme Decree 29033 to regulate consultations in the hydrocarbon 
sector - and 2012, 26 consultations were conducted, mainly on gas exploitation and 
extraction (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2013b). In the meanwhile, FPIC mechanisms were 
also included in Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution, which sets out the right to consultation 
specifically in relation to the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources (Art. 
30). This article is a watered-down version of the preliminary and more radical draft 
which promised that consent from indigenous communities would be required and 
would be binding in all resource-related activities (Bascopé Sanjinés, 2010). The 
creation of a legal obligation to prior consultation was hugely significant for the 
natural resource economy both because of the growing mobilization of indigenous 
communities and the unprecedented value of the natural resource sector given the 
high commodity prices since the early years of the twenty-first century6.  																																																								
6 Bolivia, where commodities account for 90 per cent of the country’s exports, has experienced a real 
economic bonanza and has managed to combine high commodity prices with relatively cautious 
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FPIC has thus come at a complex and delicate moment for Bolivia, when the 
government wishes to take advantage of Bolivia’s natural resources because of high 
international demand and, at the same time, is engaged in a process of 
institutionalization of new rights and autonomy regimes for indigenous peoples. 
Equally, the challenge in Bolivia – and indeed in other countries where FPIC is being 
introduced – is that the opportunity to institutionalize ethnic participation and voice 
over the use of territory and natural resources run the risk of intensifying social 
conflicts. This is a risk because of the accumulation of tensions from the past, and the 
absence of trust in the state to act in an independent and accountable manner and 
faith in its capacity or willingness to to oversee participatory consultations in a 
neutral and fully democratic way. Meanwhile, it has to be recognized that the task 
facing the government is hardly an easy one. It must represent the interests of all 
citizens and manage conflicts between groups with opposing interests yet, at the 
same time, there are inevitably demands from social groups that expect the 
government to be ‘on their side’ that it shore up the interests of its own electoral 
constituency and respect the mandate that took it into office.  
A clear example of the challenges of reaching democratic solutions to these 
conflicting interests and claims came with the conflict around the Isiboro Sécure 
National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS). In 2011, the Bolivian government 
announced a plan to construct a road through the TIPNIS as part of a Brazilian-led 
network of mega-projects aiming at generating development throughout the 
continent. The announcement triggered mass mobilization by lowland indigenous 
peoples, who, supported by environmental NGOs and urban activists, set off on a 
protest march to La Paz. Indigenous communities argued that the designation of 
TIPNIS as a park and an indigenous territory should protect it from mega-
development projects and gave them the right to be consulted. Tensions then 
developed between the indigenous groups and the peasant and coca-growers’ unions 
(mainly Aymara and Quechua settlers), who saw the road as a way of expanding the 
agrarian frontier, a process from which they would benefit (Perrier Bruslé, 2012; 
McNeish, 2013; Webber, 2012). The conflict generated international attention, which 
pushed the government into holding a consultation, the outcome from which favored 
the road building. The consultation has not resolved the conflict however – the 
indigenous communities, who demanded consultation in the first place, feel betrayed 
and refused to participate, while the outcomes have been questioned by an 
independent assessment led by the Catholic Church (Comisión Interinstitucional de 
la Iglesia Católica et al., 2012; Sub-central TIPNIS Comisión de Recorrido, 2012).  
The TIPNIS conflict reveals the difficulties of using consultations as a way to 
manage disputes where economic and cultural interests are at play. Rather than 
resolving the issues, the consultation actually exacerbated tensions between the state 
and social organizations, with some activists criticizing the weakness of the 
indigenous rights framework and the government as willing to hear only some voices 																																																																																																																																																														
macro-economic management, despite the introduction of some measures of redistribution (IMF, 
2014). 
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and claims. As the Director of CEJIS, one of the Bolivian NGOs involved in the 
TIPNIS conflict, told us:  
 
The TIPNIS demonstrates a step back from the rights of indigenous peoples linked 
to collective rights. For example, the issue of consultation is one of those rights. 
The government has interpreted the consultation as suits them, more in favor of 
their own base (La Paz, August 2013)  
 
 The point the Director of CEJIS is making becomes clearer if we unpick 
some of the background to these tensions and conflicts. Rural communities in Bolivia 
are, and have historically been, significantly fragmented, culturally and politically. 
After a period of ‘forced top-down articulation’ after the National Revolution in 
1952, when indigenous peoples were incorporated into the unionist system and pre-
existent autochthonous organizations especially were significantly weakened, 
peasant and indigenous movements took quite different paths, organizationally and 
ideologically, especially after the 1980s. With the emergence of the doctrine of neo-
indigenismo, new ethnic-based social organizations (CIDOB and CONAMAQ) were 
created. At the local level, communities decided either to join the new indigenous 
movement or to maintain their affiliation to the peasant federation, except in certain 
areas, especially in the highlands, where both types of organization co-existed 
(Rivera Cusicanqui, 1993; Gordillo, 2000). The multiplication of social movements 
that command real political resources intensified competition between opposing 
groups over control of local political institutions, land, and, in the end, over who 
would make decisions about development strategies and environmental management 
(Fontana, 2014c)  
Overall, these conflicts have been marked more by political differences than 
ethnic divisions. The identity boundaries between indígenas (indigenous from the 
lowlands), originarios (native from the highlands)7 and peasant organizations are, in 
practice, very fluid and they have continually engaged in games of alliances and 
conflicts with each other that are, above all, about political positioning. So, most 
members of peasant organizations are actually of Quechua or Aymara origin, while 
most indigenous and native peoples have very similar livelihoods to those of 
peasants and, until recently, were members of peasant unions (Gustafson, 2002; 
Canessa, 2007; Fontana, 2014c). As a member of CONAMAQ told us, the difference 
between indigenous and peasant “is a political rather than a biological issue. They 
[the peasants] understand ‘the indigenous’ and clearly they are indigenous. But they 
do not want decolonization. They are afraid to go back to the ayllus” (interview, La 
Paz, August 2013). There are cases, however, in which some peasant unions (e.g in 
the department of Chuquisaca) have started to call themselves ‘native peasant’ 
(originario campesino) to highlight their autochthonous identities and cultural roots 																																																								
7 In Bolivia, indigenous organizations from the lowlands tend to self-identify with the category 
indígena (indigenous) while indigenous organizations from the highlands rather use the concept 
originario (native). Although in English ‘indigenous’ and ‘native’ have very similar meanings, we are 
using this translation in the effort to mirror the difference reflected in the language of local actors in 
Bolivia.  
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in opposition to more recent settlers (also of Aymara and Quechua origins), and 
others where CSUTSB communities are actually undergoing a process of conversion 
into ayllus (e.g. San Andrés de Machaca, La Paz Department).  
Initially the political project of the governing party, the MAS, was to reconcile 
indigenous and peasant sectors, but in practice its ties are stronger with the peasantry 
(Do Alto, 2011; Zuazo, 2009). Futhermore, Morales’s attempt to balance his 
commitments to both sectors diminished over time (Fontana, 2013) and a crisis was 
reached with the TIPNIS conflict. As a result, the loyalty of the peasant movements 
to the MAS government have been strengthened, while indigenous and native 
organizations are now engaged in continuous confrontations with the Executive, at 
times with the support of opposition parties. Their anger at what they see as a 
betrayal of the promises that took MAS into government is palpable:  
 
During the first term, the government took note of the indigenous movement, but the 
second period of Evo Morales has been a total disgrace for native indigenous peoples, 
because the government has created norms against their interests, for example the 
Framework Law of Autonomies does not reflect the sentiments of indigenous peoples. 
(...) On the contrary, it promotes colonization, making us subject to institutions that are 
not our own (interview member CONAMAQ, cit.). 
 
Not only is the relationship with the government, and between indigenous and 
peasant sectors tense, but, since the TIPNIS conflict, social movements in Bolivia 
have also undergone fragmentation and internal conflict, leading to divisions within 
indigenous/native organizations such as CIDOB and CONAMAQ, with one branch 
remaining close to government and the other taking up more critical positions. These 
conflicts have intensified tensions, particularly in the lowlands, over who controls the 
subsoil resources that mainly lie on indigenous (especially Guaraní) land – the areas 
where most consultations have taken place so far (Bebbington and Bebbington, 2010; 
Schilling Vacaflor, 2013b).  
 
Participation for Whom? Tracing Boundaries and Distributing the Benefits of 
FPIC  
 
The conflicts around FPIC in Bolivia, then, are generated by a combination of 
context, namely sudden and unprecedented economic bonanza at a time of rising 
claims based on indigeneity, alongside the fact that FPIC acts as lightening rod for 
longstanding tensions between different social and political groups over territory and 
for access to political and economic resources. FPIC has not ‘invented’ these 
conflicts; but it has certainly magnified them. 
It is not by chance, therefore, that a national debate around a FPIC Law 
started as a result of the TIPNIS conflict, when it became clear to both the 
government and social groups that having a national regulatory framework in place 
would be of crucial importance. The final version of the Draft Law (August 2013) 
before being submitted for parliamentary approval, took twelve months of talks 
between the government and the main rural organizations, indigenous (CIDOB and 
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the Guaraní People Assembly APG), native (CONAMAQ) and peasant (CSUTCB, 
its female branch, Bartolinas, and the Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural 
Communities of Bolivia, CSCIB8), at moments when, as we explained above, these 
organizations were experimenting high levels of conflict and internal fragmentation9. 
The climate of the negotiations was, consequently, tense, with indigenous leaders 
claiming that they were not being listened to:  
 
I think the framework law has not been debated (...) with the internal organs of the 
indigenous peoples. (...) The project violates the rights of indigenous peoples 
(Adolfo Chávez, president of the ‘CIDOB oposidora’, La Razón, 18 May 2014). 
 
The government, for its part, was complaining about the opportunistic, non-
collaborative and even malicious attitude of indigenous organizations, whose 
expectations were excessive due to the “unreasonable precedents” set by consultations 
led by transnational companies:  
 
There is a complete distortion by indigenous peoples on the implementation of the 
right to consultation caused by the bad practices that we had in the past. This right 
has been corrupted, distorted, commodified (interview with Director of the Unit of 
the Ministry of Government in charge of the FPIC Law Consultations, La Paz, 
August 2013).  
 
It is not surprising that the government found it difficult to manage the 
competing demands that were articulated, for, in the end, at the heart of the conflicts 
over the FPIC Law was the conflictual question of who has the right to be consulted, 
with the implication that some groups had more rights than others. Art. 17 of the first 
FPIC Draft Law prepared by the government stated that indigenous native nations and 
peoples of the TCOs should be the subject of FPIC, while indigenous native peasant 
peoples, intercultural communities and afrobolivians are entitled to a more generic 
and less demanding public consultation  - which, in fact, according to the Constitution, 
should be a right for all Bolivians (working document, Ministerio de Gobierno, 2012). 
But this proposal provoked a massive stand-off between the government and social 
organizations, since some would have more voice than others. The peasant, 
intercultural and afrobolivian leaders argued that they have the same right to FPIC as 
much as indigenous/native groups. As the Secretary of International Affairs of the 
CSUTCB told us:  
 
There is no understanding between indigenous and peasants. The indigenous 
representatives say: “We have the right to consultation, as ‘indigenous native 
peasants’, because we have TCOs, but the peasants don’t. They have no right to 																																																								
8 A peasant union of lowlands and valleys mainly formed by people of highland origin (Aymara and 
Quechua). It was founded on 1971 as the Syndicalist Confederation of Colonizers of Bolivia and 
decided to change the name after Morales’ victory 2005 and the launch of a ‘process of 
decolonization’.  
9 At the time of the negotiations, CONAMAQ was not formally split in two branches yet, while 
CIDOB’s separation happened in those months. In the latest phase of the talks, the government was 
therefore dialoguing mainly with the branch closer to the Executive.  
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consultation because they have no [collective] land, no TCO, they have 
individual lands”. (...) But we want to be considered equal to the indigenous 
brothers. That is, if a road or something is going through a peasant community, 
we are entitled to be consulted (interview, La Paz, August 2013). 
 
The CONAMAQ, CIDOB and the APG, meanwhile, would only agree to the inclusion 
of the indigenous/native peoples and nations, as the ‘true’ subjects to benefit from 
consultation, thereby excluding all other rural groups (APG and CONAMAQ’s Draft 
Law proposals). Indigenous leaders repeatedly appealed to international agreements on 
this matter, claiming that peasant organizations do not meet the criteria of authenticity, 
nativeness and a pre-colonial existence: 
 
C.169 (…) clearly says that indigenous native people must have historical 
continuity, and the peasants have no historical continuity. Those international 
standards must be taken into account in the discussion about consultation (interview 
with CONAMAQ leader, La Paz, July 2013, emphasis our own). 
 
The conflicts over FPIC in Bolivia thus go to the heart of the dilemmas around 
collective rights, where the boundaries are to be drawn in relation to the ‘collective’ 
and who is the subject of the rights being claimed. These issues are presented in a 
remarkably unproblematic fashion in C.169. Indeed they are almost exactly as the 
CONAMAQ leader set out above. From a legal perspective, the category of 
‘indigenous peoples’ is not regarded as especially complex (Eversole et al., 2005), yet 
in fact ethnicity is a profoundly historical and sociological process. It is rare in 
practice that there are clean lines separating ‘ethnic’ communities from each other. 
The 1986 UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination of Minorities 
identified indigenous peoples as sharing the common and distinctive traits as the 
original inhabitants of a land later colonized by others; being socially marginalized in 
distinct ways; and holding fast to unique ethnic identities and cultures. But this 
assumes that, prior to colonization, no movement or mixing of peoples took place and 
that, after colonization, communities remained fully and straightforwardly distinct. In 
fact, who claims indigeneity depends mainly on historical, cultural and geopolitical 
context-specific factors. In an effort to adapt the definition of indigenous peoples 
beyond Latin America, the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples/Populations of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) and the International 
Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) have argued that self-determination 
rather than aboriginality should be considered as a key criterion for identifying 
indigenous peoples. This principle does not have a direct link with colonial 
domination but only “requires that peoples identify themselves as indigenous and as 
distinctly different from other groups within the state” (ACHPR and IWGIA, 2006: 
10). Self-identification, however, does not resolve problems of justifying why certain 
ethnic groups would be entitled to a series of rights, and other groups that might be 
equally poor and marginalized but, for different (political, cultural, ideological) 
reasons, are unable to do so, won’t. Besides, the self-identification criterion has been 
already widely applied for the identification of indigenous peoples in Latin America, 
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for example in national censuses (Barragán, 2009). This maximalist interpretation of 
indigenous identities has generally prevailed in Latin America, unlike in Africa and 
Asia where minimalist approaches have meant that very few groups are treated as 
‘indigenous’ and the terms is chiefly reserved for sparsely populated, traditional 
nomadic groups.   
Going back to Bolivia, part of the conflict was due to the fact that the 
government tried to limit the scale of consultations by adopting a minimalist 
understanding of indigenous peoples, in a context where steps had already been taken 
to institutionalize maximalist understandings of indigeneity in a series of constitutional 
reforms. In particular, as we mentioned above, within the new ‘plurinational’ regime10 
set out in the 2009 Constitution, the category ‘indígena originario campesino’ had 
already become a pivot of citizenship and, therefore, the allocation of new collective 
rights (Fontana, 2014b). To try and deny now that the right to be consulted to groups 
that self-define and are recognized as ‘peasants’ would not only be conflictual but also 
unconstitutional. The government was eventually forced to recognize these 
contradictions in the last round of negotiations and, as a result, changed its position. 
There was, finally, a recognition that: 
 
Organizations have every right to claim rights that the state can fulfill. But 
organizations have no discretion to restrict rights, at least, and even less, when they 
are constitutionalized. (...) That is primarily the responsibility of judicial bodies 
(interview with lawyer and Ministry of Government’s civil servant involved in the 
FPIC Law consultations, La Paz, August 2013). 
 
The UNDP advisor to the negotiation process (herself of Aymara origin) exercised 
some influence here, arguing that the consequences of pitting indigenous and peasants 
against each other would be disastrous for the consultation process itself:  
 
They cannot get rid of the peasants because it is in the Constitution. So the peasants 
can nullify that law if they file a constitutional complaint. I have talked to them and 
with indigenous groups, trying to moderate some very extremist attitudes, mainly 
from the CONAMAQ advisers [some of them members of the NGO CEJIS]. We 
must raise awareness because extraction will happen, and consultation is needed (La 
Paz, July 2013).   
 
																																																								
10 The Constitution does not include a definition of plurinationality, but according to a preliminary 
social originations’ proposal: “The plurinational state is a model of political organization for the 
decolonization of our nations and peoples, reaffirming, recuperating and strengthening our territorial 
autonomy (…). For the construction and consolidation of the plurinational state, the principles of 
juridical pluralism, unity, complementarity, reciprocity, equity, solidarity and the moral and ethic 
principles to stop all kind of corruption are fundamentals” (Propuesta de las Organizaciones Indígenas, 
Originarias, Campesinas y de Colonizadores hacia la Asamblea Constituyente, Sucre, 5 August 2006, 
http://www.cebem.org/cmsfiles/archivos/propuesta-organizaciones-indigenas.pdf ). On Bolivian 
plurinationalism see also Gustafson, 2009; Tapia 2011; Fabricant and Gustafson, 2011; Tockman and 
Cameron, 2014; Fontana, 2014b. 
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These conflicts might sound at first glance as though they are as a very 
Bolivian problem. But in fact, these issues echo debates in neighboring Peru11, and 
point to more general issues with FPIC. Independent of which social groups should 
have the right to consultation, there are vital questions that remain unresolved about 
who should be consulted. Should it be the community, as individuals; should 
consultation be via the traditional authorities (jilakatas or capitanos 12 , union 
secretaries), the ‘people’ (for example in this case, Guaraní, Mojeño, Yurakaré, 
Mozeten) or the leaders of the social organizations (CIDOB, CONAMAQ, CSUTCB, 
CSCIOB, etc.). This is not a small matter either in terms of democracy or in relation to 
governance. International law makes reference to a legitimate representative, 
suggesting that traditional leaders should be in charge, whilst, in Bolivia, the 
Constitution promises that “within the native indigenous peasant peoples and nations, 
the consultation will be carried out with respect given to their own norms and 
procedures” (Art. 352), offering a range of different options. This is mirrored in the 
FPIC Draft Law. This lack of clarity opens up the possibility for the state of selecting 
its partners and thus shaping the outcome. Indigenous peoples and NGOs involved in 
past consultations have already accused the Bolivian state of trying to influence results 
through interference (Bascopé Sanjinés, 2010; Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi, 2012). 
Furthermore no criteria are provided to assess the legitimacy and representativeness of 
local institutions. Recent guidelines of the ILO on C.169 try to be more specific on 
this issue, clarifying that in those cases in which the representativeness and inclusivity 
of traditional organizations can be questioned (for example with respect of women), 
there is the option of carrying out the consultation through non-traditional institutions 
or with more than one organization (ILO, 2013). However, in practice, the 
identification of relevant institutions depends on the good will of both the state and 
indigenous leaders.    
Apart from the ‘subject problem’, other serious disagreements have emerged 
that challenge the idea that FPIC can work straightforwardly as a way to guarantee a 
more inclusive, democratic and effective polity. According to indigenous 
organizations, outcomes should be binding and should always imply consent 
(consentimiento) (preliminary law proposals, CONAMAQ and APG, 2013). 
 
For CONAMAQ, consent means the right of veto. There are at least two cases of 
jurisprudence at the international level, which recognize that consent of indigenous 
peoples must be obtained. Therefore there are legal precedents (...) that support our 
position (interview with CONAMAQ leader, La Paz, August 2013). 																																																								
11 In 2010 the Peruvian parliament voted a Law on FPIC that recognized that peasant communities 
might as well be subject to consultation, if they meet the following ‘objective criteria’: “1. Direct 
descendants from country’s indigenous populations; 2. Lifestyle and spiritual and historical ties with 
the territory traditionally used or occupied; 3. Social institutions and customs; 4. Cultural patterns and 
life styles different from other sectors of the population” (Art. 7, Ley del derecho a la consulta previa a 
los pueblos indígenas u originarios, reconocido en el convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional 
del Trabajo). This is a watered-down version of the social movement’s proposal, following the 
presidential veto with the argument that, among other issues, peasant communities should not be 
entitled to consultation (Shilling-Vacagflor and Flemmer 2013).  
12 Traditional indigenous autorities.		
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However, the government argues that a veto can only be admissible in very 
specific circumstances that, crucially, would not include the exploitation of natural 
resources tout court (internal document, Ministry of Government, 2013).  
 
They [indigenous organizations] consider consent to mean the power to say yes or 
no. We understand that the consent has two goals. First - according to international 
law - the objective of reaching agreements. (...) And then there are the three cases 
established by international law and jurisprudence, where consent becomes a 
requirement for the state (interview Director of the Unit of the Ministry of 
Government, cit.) 
 
Ultimately, for the state, what is at stake is its capacity to make policy decisions in 
what they see as, or claim to be, the ‘national interest’, whilst the communities are 
inevitably more concerned with whether they can use participation and consultation to 
leverage accountability and increase their own voice in those decisions.  
Equally conflictual is the question of reparation, should development projects 
go ahead in ways that are regarded as damaging to communities. There are, in fact, 
some longstanding practices in Bolivia of transnational corporations offering 
monetary ‘compensations’ in response to claims. Indigenous representatives insist 
that these funds are used to benefit the community and promote autonomy, although 
there is little documented evidence of how these funds have been spent (Schilling-
Vacaflor, 2013a). Almost inevitably, accusations have been made that indigenous 
leaders have not been fully accountable and that the payments have ended up as part 
of the circuits of local corruption (Bascopé Sanjinés, 2010). The question now is 
whether monetary compensation should be embedded in FPIC or whether other forms 
of action should be taken. The government certainly is not keen to promote payments 
to communities. But some groups are convinced that the option of forcing companies 
to pay is essential to uphold their rights. For the Guaraní, payments of this sort are 
seen as essential to provide for welfare, education and basis services; their argument 
is that the state has never concerned itself with the Guaraní people and compensation 
is the only way to improving social and economic conditions. 
 
There is an expectation that with the issue of compensation, and through the 
consultation process, they [Guaraní people] will obtain what they haven’t got for 
over 500 years, as a result of this social and political exclusion and exploitation 
that they have suffered (interview lawyer and civil servant, cit.). 
 
 As with so much of FPIC, compensation thus becomes part of a broader and 
more complex issue to do with the provision of public goods and the relative position 
of different communities in relation to the state.   
To sum up, negotiating the FPIC Draft Law in Bolivia has led to intense 
discussions between social organizations and the state. The main points of contention 
(the subject of consultation, procedures and outcomes) highlight, on the one side, the 
greater power of social groups to make their voices heard and, on the other side, the 
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growing constraints on the state in determining national development policies. So, in 
addition to the trade-off between participation and governance efficiency, there are 
also questions about the boundaries for the access to rights based on identity when 
access to key resources is also at stake.   
 
The Challenges of Ethnic-based Participatory Governance  
 
Considering all of the above, it is perhaps not surprising that César Rodríguez-
Garavito (2011: 266) describes FPIC as “a discussion of legal procedures” that 
ultimately fails to address the power asymmetries that are embedded in the 
relationships between the state and indigenous communities, and between indigenous 
communities and private companies in search of profit from the lands indigenous 
peoples live on. Yet it is also clear that, despite these limitations, indigenous 
movements consider FPIC as an asset rather than a constraint for their collective 
rights (“it is key so that our rights are not violated”, interview CONAMAQ leader, La 
Paz, August 2013), and see it as an important mechanism to regain some control over 
territory and resources. For instance, the negotiation over the law as well as the 
TIPNIS conflict were regarded as crucial in terms of setting precedents that reflected 
the rights of indigenous movements in Bolivia and beyond: 
 
If the native indigenous movement manages to beat the government in the TIPNIS 
consultation, then it will be a good precedent for all the native indigenous 
movements nationally and internationally, because its echo will be felt outside 
Bolivia. (interview with CONAMAQ leader, La Paz, August 2013)  
 
FPIC discussions are thus shaped by the demands made by each group as it seeks to 
push interpretations that stand a chance of leading to more autonomy, power in 
decision-making, greater control over territory and economic benefits for its 
communities. But, at the same time, sitting underneath these discussions, and indeed 
FPIC as a whole, are broader questions of participation and democratic citizenship, 
which actually are also part of its legitimation. 
FPIC is rooted in the international human rights framework via the C.169 and 
UNDRIP, and is, as such, part of the drive to bring rights into democratic governance. 
The C.169 was itself the outcome of considerable mobilization nationally and 
internationally to demand a recognition of indigenous rights (Engle, 2010). 
Indigenous rights claims were genuinely transformative in Latin America and were 
part of a new understanding of citizenship (Postero, 2006). But is equally the case that 
international rights discourses do not always translate directly and easily into national 
contexts – the politics of translation mean that it is possibly for groups to claim rights 
in ways that international legislation did not anticipate or foresee. International rights 
discourses, in other words, do not ‘solve’ problems of politics.  
What this means is that FPIC is not clear as to which ‘indigenous peoples’ it 
seeks to protect and has nothing whatsoever to say to groups who might have needs or 
feel they have claims but who cannot be (or resist being) defined in ethnic terms. 
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FPIC offers partial redress for profound, historical marginalization; but in so doing it 
embeds a potentially powerful exclusionary ontology and runs the risk of violating the 
notion of equal national citizenship (Adelson et al., 2003). Prioritizing the voices of 
excluded groups over those of others can of course be justified democratically. 
Arguments could be made that indigenous peoples’ livelihood and culture are more 
dependent on their relationship to their territories and customary lands than other 
communities, and might well be persuasive. But the force of this argument depends 
on those groups formally recognized as indigenous being uniquely vulnerable; and in 
the case of Bolivia – and indeed Latin America in general - it is hard to make this 
argument. As Goodland (2004: 69) asks: “Why is it that the rural poor can be 
displaced against their will, but other peoples cannot? Can development have a double 
standard and advocate democracy for some, but autocracy for the rest?” In other 
words, FPIC really rests on an assumption of clearly identified and static cultural 
identities, and the existence of straightforward division between the powerful and the 
dispossessed along these static ethnic lines, when most ethnic identities are in fact 
fluid social constructions, dependent on politics and subject to change (Lucero, 2006; 
Li, 2000; Posner, 2004; Sylvain, 2002).  
Moreover, the performative potential of political and legal reforms that 
promote ethnicity needs to be taken into account. In Bolivia, three decades of claims 
and concessions around ethnic recognition has embedded incentives for many social 
groups to claim indigeneity for the sake of redistribution and access to resources and 
autonomy (Fontana, 2014a; McNeish, 2012 and 2013). Yet there is within FPIC an 
expectation that communities and individuals will somehow act for a ‘collective’ 
good and that people will simply put aside the potential for private gain, and indeed a 
view that they may not even have individual interests (Masaki, 2010). This has 
contributed to strengthen the dichotomy that separates ideas of ‘economic 
development’ from ‘indigenous’ political economies suggesting that indigenous 
people are intrinsically traditional (not modern), pre-capitalist (not market-focused) 
and uniquely in favor of collective rights (rather than having a preference for 
individualism). In fact, it should hardly be surprising that, faced with situations of 
poverty and exclusion, indigenous communities might come to regard FPIC as a way 
of getting access to funds and projects to improve their material conditions; and it is 
almost certainly scholarly ‘otherization’ of indigeneity that leads to expectations of 
harmony from the process, not ‘normal’ political conflict. Although the international 
framework allows for a broad understanding of FPIC which includes any measure that 
would affect indigenous peoples, in practice, this mechanism is often shaped as a 
content-specific participatory mechanism for the allocation of nationally strategic 
resources to ethnically defined social groups, and as such it seeks to partially redefine 
the locus of control of natural resources. It is not by chance that FPIC in Bolivia 
acquired meaning precisely when it was included in the Hydrocarbon Law. The 
redistributive dimension is therefore crucial – and understood as such by indigenous 
communities in Bolivia – yet it is often hidden behind a rhetoric of recognition 
(Castree, 2004), and has, therefore, been largely neglected in discussions of political 
economy. As Agrawal notes, we do not really understand the redistributive 
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consequences of participatory institutions or the extent to which such mechanisms are 
more equitable that the systems they seek to replace:  
 
Typically, intuition as well as much of the scholarship on the commons 
suggests that fairer allocation of benefits is likely to lead to more sustainable 
institutional arrangements. But in a social context characterized by highly 
hierarchical social and political organization, institutional arrangements 
specifying asymmetric distribution of benefits may be more sustainable even 
if they are entirely unfair (Agrawal, 2003: 244).  
 
This view has been reinforced by the oversimplified understanding of local 
communities (as small, integrated groups using local norms to manage resources 
sustainably) embedded in mainstream environmental conservation literature, which 
fails to account for local politics, strategic interaction and conflict within and between 
communities (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). In fact, local (indigenous) communities do 
not always respect democratic principles and are not always a repository of the 
‘common good’ (Arnold and Spedding, 2005; Thede, 2011; Yashar, 2007, Alpa Shah, 
2007; Kuper, 2003; Thede, 2011). The extent to which indigenous communities 
operate along democratic lines depends in practice on a variety of factors, including 
the quality and effectiveness of their institutions and norms (Agrawal and Gibson 
1999).  
Institutions are therefore crucial in determining the procedures and outcomes of 
participatory processes. When deliberative mechanisms are weak, FPIC is likely to 
become an exercise of strategic bargaining rather than an inclusive process with the 
‘collective’ interest at the center. This is exactly what has happened in many of the 
consultations conducted so far in Bolivia (Schilling-Vacaflor 2013a, Bascopé 
Sanjinés, 2010). Yet, by assuming that indigenous groups have internal mechanisms 
for conflict-resolution and that their decision-making processes are intrinsically 
legitimate, inclusive and non-authoritarian, the chance for any proactive engagement 
to strengthen local institutions is lost. Indeed, while C.169 mentions the need to 
“establish means for the full development of these peoples’ own institutions and 
initiatives, and in appropriate cases provide the resources necessary for this purpose” 
(Art 6), in practice, this provision has been scarcely debated and even less applied, 
and discussion has instead focused overwhelmingly on FPIC as a tool of 
empowerment that can work in any circumstances and context. This is despite the fact 
that recent studies show that assumptions embedded in romanticized views of 
‘traditional authorities’ downplay the complexity and fluidity of institutional 
legitimacy and the fact that, in certain cases, “choosing the correct, downwardly 
accountable institution to represent those receiving rights may not be an option” 
(Larson et al., 2015: 236) at all. In practice, not only are some participatory 
mechanisms less inclusive and democratic than they claim to be, but those 
mechanisms sometimes rely on inadequate or non-existent institutions. In some cases, 
new ‘traditional forms of governance’ are required and have to be created brand new. 
A recent example in Bolivia is the process of institutionalization of some AIOCs 
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where, in certain cases, the absence of representative local institutions meant that 
communities have opted to create municipalities:  
 
When this process started [creation of the AIOCs], they [the government] thought 
“these [indigenous peoples] have their own governments, it will be easy because 
they will do what they have always done”. But it does not work like that in practice. 
(…) The autonomous statutes of some native communities (...) is in fact a copy of 
the municipality. (…) Instead of deepening and empowering their own system, they 
keep fighting for whom is the Executive, the Legislative, who the mayor and who 
the local councilor (interview with officer Fundación Tierra, La Paz, August 2013). 
 
In other cases, traditional representative mechanisms do not work when transposed to 
local government:  
 
In many places, indigenous assemblies are held once a year, but this no longer 
makes sense, because things [need to be] done. Thus people are now suggesting 
having an assembly every month of all the communities (interview with officer 
Fundación Tierra, cit.). 
 
As with other processes of citizenship creation, FPIC relies on local institutions 
working properly. Paying more attention first to how these institutions work in the 
first place would, logically, produce better FPIC regulation.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Interest in FPIC initiatives is growing for reasons that range from efforts to build 
more equitable management of natural resources to attempts to introduce more 
effective local-scale practices of participation and active citizenship. But as we have 
tried to show here, using Bolivia as an example, FPIC is not a neutral, apolitical 
exercise that will somehow straightforwardly lead to better or more democratic 
governance. In particular, there are major concerns about whether FPIC can act as a 
mechanism to expand democratic inclusion and participation in societies where there 
are high levels of already existing ethnic politicization. The way in which FPIC is 
currently being implemented and framed in Bolivia is in tension with broader ideas of 
representation and legitimacy, inclusiveness and management of public and common 
goods because there is no real clarity as to who is entitled to participation, why they 
do and whether they are doing so as a corrective to exclusion, a promotion of 
citizenship or as a mechanism for redistribution. As a consequence, there are 
democratic concerns as to whether FPIC-related decisions will be made in the interest 
of the majority of citizens, or even the majority of the poor. Without efforts to 
mediate between social groups and to take into account local dynamics, there is a risk 
that FPIC might well even introduce new forms of inequality. FPIC’s place within the 
broader framework of democratic governance is thus at worst questionable and at best 
unclear. 
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We do not, of course, wish to argue against local consultation tout court or 
against ethnic-based political representation. The positive effects of ethnic political 
representation on democracy, community wellbeing and social inclusion in Bolivia 
and elsewhere are evident (Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2014; Postero 2006). We recognize 
that there are strong arguments in favor of decentralization of environmental planning 
and we acknowledge the potential that FPIC has to embed new spaces of dialogue and 
decision-making. Communities that have suffered longstanding marginalization might 
also directly benefit from the access to new resources or compensatory measures 
targeted to improve social services and livelihoods. But we also have to recognize that 
FPIC is not a magic solution to problems of participation and that emphasizing 
localized decision-making can sometimes buttress the power of local elites, create 
non-accountable institutions and have negative implications for other vulnerable 
groups (Lane, 2003; Ehrenberg, 1999; Goodland, 2004). It can also trigger 
depoliticizing effects on contentious processes and become a “technology of 
government” unable to account for the aspirations and decisions of local communities 
(Perreault, in press). It is clear, at the very least, that far more attention to community 
micro-politics is required in order to understand how the new participatory 
frameworks might actually work in practice.  
The way in which the discussion around FPIC in Bolivia has been framed 
highlight three issues that should be carefully considered while rethinking ethnic-
based consultation mechanisms both domestically and internationally. Firstly, efforts 
should also be directed to strengthening representative and democratic local 
institutions. In other words, respecting indigenous rights should not imply giving up 
on the democratization agenda. Secondly, state capacity in conflict management 
should be improved, allowing accountable state institutions to play an active role in 
mediating the relationship between different actors and guaranteeing an equitable 
outcome in consultation processes. Finally, the performative effect of FPIC on social 
and political boundaries around ethnicity (indigeneity) should be considered. Those 
boundaries are not always erected or imposed by the state, and they can be the result 
of the effort of social groups to gain exclusive access to certain rights, resources and 
power. Whether this would be justified as compensation for past injustices or as 
empowerment of vulnerable groups, any limitation in access to new rights and 
participatory spaces should be carefully evaluated and agreed between the state and 
an inclusive range of social actors, and consistency between the means and goals of 
participatory measures should be ensured.  
From a theoretical perspective, the complexities around FPIC challenges 
assumptions that there is somehow a linear relationship between democracy and 
ethnic-based rights claims. The introduction of new ethnic-based rights to voice does 
not automatically lead to a more equal society. This is particularly the case where new 
rights claims imply access to strategic and material resources. We call, therefore, for 
further, grounded research on how FPIC actually operates in different domestic 
contexts in order to understand more fully the challenges, as well as the opportunities, 
it presents as an instrument of inclusive participation, distribution, equity and, not 
least, democracy.  
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